“Any means necessary to protect our race. I am a racist and I am proud of it, because I love my race I’m going to defend it”
– these words were proclaimed by the leader of the direct action organization Betyarsereg (the Outlaws’ Army) Zsolt Tyirityan during the demonstration against the ‘gypsy crime’ in the small Hungarian village Devecser in August 2012.
What makes these words even more striking is the fact that the Outlaws’ Army is far from being a fringe direct action organization in Hungary, since it is closely associated with the second-most popular Hungarian party- the radical right-wing populist Jobbik party. In 2009 the Outlaws’ Army and Jobbik signed a cooperation contract, declaring that they would “support each other and take part in each other’s events.”
Similarly, the members of the Romanian far-right populist New Right party (ND) and a newly-formed ultranationalist Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) party aim to build an ‘ethnocratic state’ only for pure Romanians while speaking against ‘gypsy danger’ and “in favor of stiff punishments for ‘gypsy crimes’”, including the confinement of all Roma in ‘reservation camps.’
This blog will thus analyze and compare the reasons behind the rise of populism – with a specific focus on far-right populism- in Central and Eastern European countries of Hungary and Romania.
I will argue that populism in those countries was not triggered by either one of the factors: instead, it was instigated by a mixture of various economic, political, social (cultural) and historical aspects initiated at the ‘right’ moment of time.
I chose Hungary and Romania for this analysis mainly due to their geopolitical location in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which is known for its proliferating far-right-wing populist tendencies among their fringe and mainstream parties.
What is Populism?
This dichotomous separation of society into the ‘us vs. them’– that is, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ or the Other- whereas politics is referred to be an expression of the ‘general will of the people’ is characteristic of populism.
Populism is centered around the premise that “virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions.” The far-right populism, is grounded upon the “triangle of nationalism, the secularization of migration related to the vision of a war between civilizations, and anti-liberalism and anti-establishment sentiments.”
The comparison between the ‘simple people’ who are portrayed as honest, hardworking and sincere, and deceiving, lazy, stupid and criminal Others feeds off a culture of resentment, which, in turn, polarizes the society, generates a sense of shared identity among the masses and subsequently unites followers across the party lines.
Unlike the Western European countries where the growth of right-wing populism is a relatively recent phenomenon, the Central and Eastern European(CEE) countries have a long history of populism.
For instance, Hungary’s interwar period was ‘drowned’ in populist discourses: from right-wing conservative rule and outright Nazi dictatorship, to communist rule, which lasted for 40 years after World War II.
Most importantly, unlike the Western European countries where the majority of the right-wing parties remain at the fringes, most of the CEE countries’ right-wing populist parties are mainstream parties.
Reasons behind the Rise of Populism in Hungary
In Hungary, the promises of benefits of transitioning away from communism – that is, the development of human rights, rule of law and privatization- and towards the democratic system were not upheld. The temporary economic and political difficulties, caused by the transition, have, in the eyes of many, robbed the masses of a certain degree of confidence guaranteed by the communist regimes.
According to the 2009 Pew Research Center survey, Hungary is the country with the highest proportion of respondents (72%) among the CEE countries who believe that they are worse off economically than under communism, while per 2011 survey, around 45% of Hungarians “would have supported replacing democracy with an authoritarian system if the change came with rapid economic development.”
The post-communist transition period has been now regarded as only benefitting the elites, who in their race for power focused on the attainment of the short-term political support through corruption and the proclamation of unrealistic promises, such as the extension of welfare benefits and tax cuts during the economic crises, which undeniably failed to materialize. These unrealized promises, have, naturally, triggered the decline in the authority of political institutions and fed off the anti-establishment sentiments within the masses.
The goal of populists, therefore, is to create a permanent crisis cycle by taking ownership of the political contradictions usually triggered by them and pushing it toward becoming an actual crisis. In fact, it is not the crisis itself that favors populism, but “it is populists who fuel a ‘permanent crisis cycle’ that consists of a continuous search for ‘crisis ownership’ around stable or emerging political contradictions.”
The right-wing populist parties were thus able to redefine the conventional political cleavages by attracting and uniting many alienated voters through the accentuation upon their distance from the mainstream parties.
Through the politicization of issues previously neglected by the mainstream parties, such as the pre-existing ethnic prejudices, the right-wing populism led to the disappearance of the traditional left-right divide, by setting “the new political frontline between the ‘Old’ and ‘New’, representing the ‘Global’ and the ‘National’.”
Hungary is an extremely interesting country case to analyze, not only because it is governed by populists, but also because it is an exceptional EU Member State in which in 2010 the Fidesz party attained a supermajority (two-thirds majority of seats) in parliament- “a revolution in the ballot box”– which allowed it to unilaterally adopt a new constitution and to change the electoral law without the opposition’s support. Since then, Hungary has become a hybrid regime, or a competitive authoritarian state- that is, a state “where democratic institutions exist in theory, but the rule of law and civil liberties are severely limited in practice.”
The Fidesz party has thus implemented a variety of various illiberal practices affecting:
- the judiciary, such as the dismissal of the president of the Highest Court, the lowering of the retirement age of judges and their replacement with loyal Fidesz followers, and the approval of a new constitution- the Fundamental Law- approved by only Fidesz lawmakers.
- the media, through the establishment of a government-dominated regulatory body, the Media Council, and the creation of a media empire which encompasses 476 outlets spreading disinformation, anti-Western and pro-Russian narratives;
- the opposition parties, which now have to deal with a new majoritarian electoral system which greatly disadvantages them and makes it extremely hard for the fragmented center-right to mount an effective opposition.
This way, Fidesz was able to erase all systems that acted as checks and balances on its power and to take control over local politics and the public discourse, as well as to create a political system that is fully tailored to its political interests. Besides the aforementioned elimination of the system of checks and balances, systemic corruption has also been blossoming ever since.
Most importantly, the Fidesz’ exclusionary rhetoric which is oftentimes publicly proclaimed by its leader, Victor Orban, has quickly made the prime minister of a relatively small EU member state “the most outspoken opponent of Merkel’s pro-refugee policies and of (West) European ‘multiculturalism’”– that is, the most outspoken opponent of the core ideals espoused by the EU.
The main reasons behind such an overwhelming popularity of the populist right-wing Fidesz party is the unique combination of the:
1.Rise of a culture of resentment and anti-establishment sentiments among Hungarians against the backdrop of the highly fragmented bipolar political competition;
- In fact, populism is characterized by disgust of mainstream parties which are regarded to be corrupt and inadequate “and which constitute an elite establishment conspiracy against ‘ordinary people’.”
- What makes Hungary a unique country in the region is the fact that its opposition was divided into the:
- Democratic Opposition, which was initially represented by the Demokrata Ellenzek (DE) party,
- and the “popular-national” opposition which “articulated its political aspirations as commitments to the values of the people and the nation” represented by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) party– the first Hungarian populist party.
- These parties could never reach a consensus among each other, and thus could not effectively represent their electorate as well as mount an effective opposition against the ruling regimes.
2. long (and disappointing) tenure of the left (the Hungarian Socialist Party) in the office;
- The utterly undermined credibility of the ruling Socialist Party was characterized by “corruption struggles, power struggles inside the party and the resignation in the middle of the election period in 2004 of Peter Medgyessy.”
3. the global economic crisis of 2008;
4. and Hungarian nationalism.
- Nationalism, as another element of the far-right populist rhetoric, has been focused upon the victimization of the nation.
- In Hungary specifically, it is manifested “in a nostalgia towards greater Hungary” which includes the abandoned after WWI (Trianon Treaty) two-thirds of its territory.
The emergence of the right-wing populist parties, such as the MDF party and later the extremist and “too baldly anti-Semitic” MIEP and Jobbik parties, thus led to the redefinition of the conventional political cleavages: their accentuation upon their distance from the mainstream parties and the creation of scandals through the politicization of topics previously disregarded by the latter, such as the pre-existing ethnic prejudices, enabled those parties to attract many alienated voters.
The Importance of the Pre-existing Ethnic Prejudices for the Populist Discourse
The importance of the pre-existing ethnic prejudices for the success of populist discourses cannot be overemphasized.
In fact, most radical right parties “seek to transform liberal democracy into an ethnocratic regime, which gives supremacy to the interests of ‘the people’”: the language of nativism and/or ethnicity thus generates a shared sense of identity which is reinforced by the “activation of available us-them boundaries” and the shifting of blame of all societal ills upon ‘the Other’– people who are not ‘pure’ Hungarians, Romanians.
In fact, the far-right group rely upon the claims based on identity to gather support and acceptance of their political stances, which, in turn, leads “to the idealization of the past and the stigmatization of minority groups who do not fit the narrative.”
For instance, one of the leaders of the first Hungarian populist party- the MDF- Istvan Csurka (who in 1993 formed his own radical right-wing MIEP party) employed the populist anti-Semitic rhetoric, which was used in Hungary since the end of World War I when Jews were not considered ‘pure’ Hungarians and were denied access to Hungarian universities, certain professions and the civil service. He proclaimed that the party needs a “Christian Course” and that the Hungarian Socialist Party was “a party of Jews” that engaged with capitalist organizations “such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to ruin Hungary.”
Since the defining element of populism is to stand for, and with, ‘the people’ and the projection of their political discourse as ‘the will of people’, “anyone disagreeing with the populist force- be they electoral competitors or any critic- really attacks ‘the people’.” Thus, it is not surprising why Csurka labelled anyone who was believed to be an enemy of the MIEP ‘Jewish’.
Besides the ‘Jewish Question’, Hungary faces a ‘gypsy problem’. Over centuries, Roma, who were always seen as a “social problem that needs a solution”, have encountered “racism, marginalization, extreme poverty and violence, including their victimization during the Holocaust.”
Thus, the various forms of Roma stigmatization, which were centered upon the pre-established anti-Roma sentiments, were adopted and further reinforced by Hungarian far-right populist parties to attract the ‘economic losers’ of the transition who were now voting in support of the latter as a way of demonstrating their anti-establishment stance.
For instance, one of the most notorious Hungarian radical right-wing parties- the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)– which was established in 2003 in direct response to the bipolar competition between the Socialists and the Fidesz, emphasized that it is the ‘Christian’ protector “of the nation against assaults and onslaughts by enemies both without and within.”
This way, Jobbik has purposefully politicized Hungarian pre-existing ethnic prejudices, which were previously disregarded by Hungarian mainstream parties, in order to both emphasize upon its anti-establishment stance and to artificially create a sense of shared identity among the alienated masses.
The significance of various ‘tools’ which are used by right-wing populist parties to spread its message and to rally the popular support should not be overlooked.
Scapegoating of minorities
For example, in order to look professional and to “claim that it does not endorse violence in any way”, Jobbik created the direct action organization- the Hungarian Guard – which is responsible for the strengthening of the “national self-defense” and organizing various demonstrations in support of Jobbik.
In reality, the term ‘national self-defense’ actually means the protection of Hungarian ‘purity’ and its values, which, by definition,
cannot be embracing of minorities such as Roma or Jews.
For this reason, the Hungarian Guard (with unofficial sanction from Jobbik) has committed itself to various violent raids against minorities which involve verbal threats (“you are going to die here”) and physical abuse.
Roma became scapegoats “for politicians who sought to consolidate their own positions or distract the public’s attention from actual problems”, such as the rise of unemployment, financial cutbacks and diminishing access to social welfare.
Besides Roma and Jews, other minorities (or the Other), such as immigrants, LGBTQ people and Romanians, have also come under fire of far-right Hungarian populists.
Interestingly enough, “while objection against the Roma was always the strongest, opposition to refugees/migrants, Arabs and Muslims has caught up with or even eclipsed it.”
Such xenophobia is mainly grounded in the perceived cultural differences, which are explained as a war between cultures and civilizations: the far-right populist narratives speak of a two-front war against both the ‘Islamization’ of Europe and the liberal ideologies of multiculturalism and gender equality.
Far-right populists, guided by their anti-communist sentiments, began equating communism with the EU, since they believe that the EU forces “dictatorship of liberal values on their citizens and other countries.”According to them, the liberal elites in Brussels are now dictating their values the same way Moscow did upon the USSR.
Anti-Muslim discourses are related to the populist narrative of the existence of a cultural war between the Christian West and the Muslim world. The far-right media oftentimes depicts Islam as a violent religion, by describing it as “fundamentalist, jihadist, terrorist”, and by cherry-picking specific international events that fit the above-mentioned descriptions. They also link Muslim refugees and immigrants to crimes and call them invaders, who desire “to force their culture on the peoples of Europe and establish Islamic caliphate on the continent”, subsequently forcing Europeans into the minority. For this reason, both the governing party and other far-right populist parties in Hungary explicitly exclude the possibility of Muslim refugee’s peaceful coexistence with Christian Hungary, let alone their integration in Europe.
The governing Fidesz party has also indirectly proclaimed that an “ethnically homogeneous country is better than the multicultural West.” Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orban, has publicly advocated “for keeping Hungary Hungarian, and Europe European”– that is, for ‘Europe of Nations’ concept. Most far-right populists believe that the EU should give up on its vision of federalism, and should instead be based “on national sovereignty, the more active participation of national parliaments, and equality between nations.”
On the other hand, some populists are still willing to accept a more flexible institutional European structure, and even to deepen integration in the defense policy.
The popularity of the aforementioned factors explain how the Fidesz, as the mainstream conservative party which was an integral part of the ‘establishment’- that is, directly responsible for all Hungarian economic and political miseries and failed promises- became even more popular in 2010 when it won the national election: it managed to quickly change its political direction from center-right conservatism to right-wing populism.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand that the populist ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric was not only strategically important to the new parties such as Jobbik, but also to the mainstream Fidesz party, which embarked upon its path in order to shift the blame of Hungarian economic deficiencies and corruption upon the ‘corrupted elites’, the EU and the Other as an attraction tool for the masses’ votes.
Media, too, plays an extremely important role in facilitation of the rise of the right-wing parties as it enables the visibility of their political discourses through the engagement of sensationalist headlines.
In fact, “the access of political newcomers to the public sphere is contingent on their relationship with mainstream media”, which helps to distort and amplify the political struggles in their favor as well as to disseminate their political message.
Since in Hungary the mainstream Fidesz party has turned rightward, the far-right populist political discourse is subsequently also became integrated in the mainstream media- that is, Fidesz-controlled media.
Therefore, the Jobbik-espoused topics, including “the relationship to European Union (EU) institutions, the situation of the Roma community, corruption, criminality, and welfare abuse [are now also] framed in the mainstream [Fidesz discourse].”
Social media plays an especially important role in disseminating the radical-right populist discourse and uniting the like-minded people, as its forums “can rather lead to a retreat into opinion where people interact within ‘nodes’ where views tend to become more entrenched.”
Social media thus enables people to bond with each other through the simplified narratives: “people claim solidarity with the ‘movement’, post love-hearts, symbolic images, emojis, and express moral alignment” which gives rise to ‘affective connectivity.’
In places where ‘affective connectivity’ is highly concentrated, it becomes difficult to post comments which would contradict the ‘mood’ of the masses. This, in turn, explains “why social media forums tend to be places where normal restraint against expression of overt racist views is not observed.”
Moreover, the preferred oversimplified discourses used in those social media forums emphasize that “political debates have moved away from more clearly articulated ideas to having a rather symbolic nature”– this fact fits ideally with the populist notion that politics should illuminate simplicity– as expressed in its oversimplified ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric- and thus it is clear now why so many extremist parties use social media as their way to disseminate political discourses and rally followers.
The European Union
Since the EU symbolizes the liberal West, most far-right populist parties are Eurosceptic. Paradoxically enough, however, later Jobbik has changed its stance on the EU: during their 2019 EP election they have acknowledged the EU’s usefulness in solving global challenges.
One of the most important explanations of Jobbik’s change of political views regarding the EU was grounded in its ability to find political legitimacy through the European Parliament, where three of its members sit beside the far-right representatives from other EU member states. This presents the party with a great opportunity to build a trans-European political alliance or bloc and to strengthen the power of far-right politicians elsewhere. The EU (and especially the EP) thus paradoxically enables Jobbik “to find a far larger audience to disseminate their anti-capitalist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma views.”
To be sure, the Hungarian rule of law does face a huge opposition in the EU: for instance, on 12 September 2018 the Fidesz party was challenged by the EP which proclaimed that the rule of law in Hungary was of a “systematic threat to the EU’s fundamental principles” and with the support of the majority of MEPs it censured the country and triggered Article 7 of the TEU, while on March 2019, the EPP suspended Fidesz, “stripping its members of their voting rights and the right to propose candidates for posts.”
However, this does not mean that the Fidesz has no influence in the EU as the 2019 European elections left the party with the “second largest faction within the EPP group in Brussels.” Moreover, despite the party’s suspension within the EPP, its MEP Livia Jaroka was reelected as one of the EP’s fourteen vice-presidents.
Therefore, it is clear that both Jobbik and Fidesz have a tremendous influence in the EU and can thus encourage the foreign right-wing parties to follow their path in their countries. In fact, recently, “Hungary has become a hub of the international far-right network with many activists visiting or even moving to Hungary mainly because of the friendly political climate.”
All of these populist ‘tools’ have led to the radicalization of the general population, the legitimization of hate speech and anti-minority sentiments in Hungary.
The Spread of Populism in Romania
Romania, as a country where many people similarly support the exclusionary rhetoric against the backdrop of the unstable economic situation and low levels of public trust in institutions, has thus great chances of following Hungary’s illiberal path.
In fact, as in Hungary, the Romanian post-communist transition brought economic stagnation and political fragmentation to the country, which, alongside the “moral nihilism and the culture of hatred and envy” against Roma and other minorities, fuelled the appearance of populism.
Out of all European countries Romania has the largest population of Roma: “2.5 million of Europe’s 12 million Roma live in Romania, a country of 19 million inhabitants” and the process of democratization imposed a heaviest toll on them, since they had to face a long-term poverty, which, in conjunction with their segregation, reinforced the ‘poverty trap’ as they did not have an access to education, housing and labor markets.
However, their poverty is being blamed on them and they are depicted as an “uneducated group that is dependent on public welfare money.”
Therefore, it is only logical that Romanian right-wing parties, such as the New Right party and the PPDD party, use the same populist discourses of stigmatization of the Roma as their Hungarian counterparts because they too “perceive the rights of native Romanians to have been sacrificed in favor of special treatment of the Roma and other minorities.”
Despite the fact that Romanian right-wing media is isolated “and the radical-right populist discourses they disseminate are generally ignored by mainstream media”, since, unlike Hungary, Romania is not governed by the rightist forces which could take media under its control, there are still plenty of other ‘tools’ which are utilized by Romanian populists that help them to disseminate their political message.
For instance, they use various social media platforms which portray their activities and political discourses, as well as enable them to exchange racist jokes.
Romanian Facebook page Rasul, which is a media company that brings amusing material from across the Internet, portrays the opportunity of “mixing of humor, venting of frustration, extreme racism and sexual violence as those posting entertain each other, create bonds, ‘bravely’ calling out the Roma”, the corrupt elites and the Other.
Some Romanian far-right populists use the support of the church, which is the most trusted institution in the country, supported
by 55 percent of the general population (in contrast to the parliament and president supported by 11 and 28 percent, respectfully), to promote their messages on their popular TV channels.
For instance, a recently-formed ultranationalist Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) party, which was formed in 2019, suddenly rose to become the fourth-largest party in Romanian parliament since 2020 due to its capitalization on the effective social media strategy and a support from the Romanian Orthodox Church.
It should also be noted that, like Hungarian Fidesz, AUR’s success was also based upon their willingness to discuss taboo issues. For example, its leader, Claudiu Tarziu, is trying to push an agenda to ban same-sex marriages (and even organized an unsuccessful constitutional referendum in 2018 to pursue this goal).
Alike Fidesz, AUR also calls “for the union of all territories where ethnic Romanians live, especially neighboring Moldova.” The party has also capitalized on the economic inequality, especially suffered by the Romanian diaspora working low-paid jobs in western Europe, as well as used the anti-establishment rhetoric to blame foreign companies for taking their profits out of Romania, as well as the anti-coronavirus measures. Despite the fact that Romanian diaspora has traditionally voted for liberal parties, with the establishment of the AUR, one in four Romanians abroad voted for it since it became the only party talking about the diaspora’s worth, “uniting Romanians wherever they are… for [their] very existence as a nation.” AUR’s leaders have explicitly proclaimed themselves as being ‘against the system’, which “has not offered enough opportunities in the country and facilitated the departure of millions of Romanians.”
Moreover, as their Hungarian counterparts, Romanian far-right parties seek to mobilize support and to employ direct action groups in order to rely on localized anxieties to generate support: this reliance on backdoor nationalism taps “into deep-rooted beliefs and prejudices in society regarding particular communities regarded as ‘other’.”
In fact, alike Hungarian Guard, Romanian action groups practice verbal and physical abuse against the Other: for instance, they employ ‘territorial stigma’ as a way to alert authorities that a particular geographical location is “a dominant Gypsy place, and that increasing the number of Gypsies would bring illness and create a place where children are afraid to go out in the evening”, in order to persuade the authorities to forcibly evict the Roma from their homes or to imprison them.
Despite the uniqueness of Hungarian experience that enabled the right-wing populist party Fidesz to win election campaigns in 2010, 2014 and 2018 and to govern Hungary, with their prominence in the EU they can greatly influence ‘illiberal developments’ in other countries.
Romania, as a country with very similar historical, cultural, economic and political experiences is extremely prone to populist ‘infection’. Frankly, it might only be lacking the support from the ‘outside’ which would enable its radical-right populist parties to take over.
The possibility of the spread of far-right populism is especially alarming as the consequences of the management of the COVID-19 pandemic can present populists with even more opportunities to politicize the policies unsuccessfully implemented by governments, leading to real and unpredictable crises.
In order to be able to prevent the possible spread of populism to other CEE countries, it is extremely important to research political, cultural, historical and economic developments in that region in order to understand what combination of factors is more likely to lead to the development of the Hungary-style illiberal democracy in those countries and whether they all share the same combination.
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- Krekó, Péter, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and Patrik Szicherle. “Anti-Muslim Populism in Hungary: From the Margins to the Mainstream.” Brookings, July 24, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/.
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- Ulceluse, Magdalena. “How the Romanian Diaspora Helped Put a New Far-Right Party on the Political Map.” LSE, December 17, 2020. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/12/17/how-the-romanian-diaspora-helped-put-a-new-far-right-party-on-the-political-map/.
 Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, “The Rise of Jobbik, Populism, and the Symbolic Politics of Illiberalism in Contemporary Hungary,” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2015): pp. 79-111, https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1756943977?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=14771, 89.
 Murer, Ibid, 88.
 Murer, Ibid, 91.
 Remus Cretan and Thomas O’Brien , “‘Get out of Traian Square!’: Roma Stigmatization as a Mobilizing Tool for the Far Right in Timişoara, Romania,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research , June 17, 2019, pp. 833-847, https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/full/10.1111/1468-2427.12775, 839.
 Agnes Batory, “Populists in Government? Hungary’s ‘System of National Cooperation,’” Democratization 23, no. 2 (February 2016): pp. 283-303, https://journals-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/details/13510347/v23i0002/283_pighonc.xml, 284.
 Péter Krekó, Bulcsú Hunyadi , and Patrik Szicherle , “Anti-Muslim Populism in Hungary: From the Margins to the Mainstream,” Brookings, July 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/.
 Batory, Ibid, 289.
 Batory, Ibid, 288.
 Renata Uitz, “Hungary: High Hopes Revisited,” in Democratization and the European Union: Comparing Central and Eastern European Post-Communist Countries, ed. Leonardo Morlino and Wojciech Sadurski (Routledge, 2010), pp. 45-69, 46.
 Batory, Ibid, 291.
 Batory, Ibid, 292.
 Andras Kovacs, “The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary,” in Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral (Bloomsbury , 2013), pp. 223-233, 224.
 Giuliano Bobba and Nicolas Hubé, “Populism and Covid-19 in Europe: What We Learned from the First Wave of the Pandemic,” LSE, April 20, 2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/04/20/populism-and-covid-19-in-europe-what-we-learned-from-the-first-wave-of-the-pandemic/.
 Bobba, Ibid.
 Kovacs, Ibid, 226.
 Batory, Ibid, 288.
 Batory, Ibid, 285.
 Krekó, Ibid.
 Batory, Ibid, 295.
 Cas Mudde, “The 2019 EU Elections: Moving the Center,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (October 2019): pp. 20-34, https://muse-jhu-edu.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/article/735456, 31.
 Petre Breazu and David Machin, “Racism toward the Roma through the Affordances of Facebook: Bonding, Laughter and Spite,” Discourse and Society 30, no. 4 (April 4, 2019): p. 376-394 , https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/full/10.1177/0957926519837396?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=discovery-provider, 380.
 Murer, Ibid, 81.
 Jens Becker, “ The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary,” Journal of Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 13, no. 1 (2010): pp. 29-40, https://www-jstor-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/43293344?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents, 31.
 Krekó, Ibid.
 Murer, Ibid, 83.
 Remus Cretan and Thomas O’Brien , “’Get out of Traian Square!’: Roma Stigmatization as a Mobilizing Tool for the Far Right in Timisoara, Romania ,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, June 17, 2019, pp. 833-847, https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/full/10.1111/1468-2427.12775, 835.
 Cretan, Ibid, 834.
 Cretan, Ibid, 845.
 Murer, Ibid, 82.
 Batory, Ibid, 289.
 Murer, Ibid, 83.
 Breazu, Ibid, 378.
 Murer, Ibid, 102.
 Murer, Ibid, 92.
 Murer, Ibid, 88.
 Murer, Ibid, 89.
 Breazu, Ibid, 378.
 Krekó, Ibid.
 Gabriella Szabo, Ov Christian Norocel , and Marton Bene , “Media Visibility and Inclusion of Radical Right Populism in Hungary and Romania,” Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 1 (May 2, 2018), https://www-tandfonline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2018.1460208, 33.
 Szabo, Ibid, 35.
 Szabo, Ibid, 43.
 Szabo, Ibid, 36.
 Breazu, Ibid, 379.
 Murer, Ibid, 92.
 Murer, Ibid, 94.
 Mudde, Ibid, 32.
 Krekó, Ibid.
 Sergiu Gherghina and Sergiu Miscoiu, “A Rising Populist Star: The Emergence and Development of the PPDD in Romania,” Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 22, no. 2 (May 2014): p. 181-197 , https://journals-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/details/0965156x/v22i0002/181_arpstedotpir.xml, 184.
 Breazu, Ibid, 378.
 Cretan, Ibid, 836.
 Cretan, Ibid, 834.
 Szabo, Ibid, 43.
 Breazu, Ibid, 380.
 Breazu, Ibid, 390.
 Valerie Hopkins , “Far-Right Party Changes Political Landscape in Romania,” Financial Times, December 14, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/040ab76c-cbef-4f2d-9b88-9f2d9ae7acfd.
 Magdalena Ulceluse, “How the Romanian Diaspora Helped Put a New Far-Right Party on the Political Map,” LSE, December 17, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/12/17/how-the-romanian-diaspora-helped-put-a-new-far-right-party-on-the-political-map/.
 Cretan, Ibid, 834.
 Cretan, Ibid, 845.
 Cretan, Ibid, 842.
 Bobba, Ibid.